Civil War determinants: The case of Iraq and Syria\u27s civil war and the rise of Islamic State (ISIS) by Hassan, Goran Kamal
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2016
Civil War determinants: The case of Iraq and Syria's
civil war and the rise of Islamic State (ISIS)
Goran Kamal Hassan
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hassan, Goran Kamal, "Civil War determinants: The case of Iraq and Syria's civil war and the rise of Islamic State (ISIS)" (2016).
Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 15927.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/15927
 
Civil war determinants: The case of Iraq and Syria’s civil war and the rise of 










A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty  
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 




Major: Political Science  
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Mark Nieman, Major Professor 
Olga Chyzh 











Copyright © Goran Hassan, 2016. All rights reserved. 
  
	 ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT iii 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CIVIL WAR DETERMINANTS 7 
State Capacity 8 
Ethnic Grievances 15 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: STATE CAPACITY 20 
Ethnic Grievances; Horizontal Inequality 23 
Third Party Assistance  26 
RESEARCH DESIGN 33 
Independent Variables 34 
Control Variables 36 
FINDINGS 39 
THE CASE OF IRAQ & SYRIA’S CIVIL WARS: THE RISE OF ISLAMIC 
STATE (ISIS)	 45	
Background 45 
Iraq’s Civil War 51 





This paper evaluates the effect of three key mechanisms—state capacity, ethnic 
grievances, and third party assistance—on the probability of civil war onset from 1960 to 1999. 
Using cross-national data logistic analysis for 160 countries, I found that states with poor 
governance quality are more prone to civil conflict. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed 
using GDP/Per Capita and tax ratio as two indicators for the state’s administrative quality.  
Second, ethnic grievances are measured by the degree of economic and political disparities 
across ethnic groups (horizontal inequality). In contrast, to several recent influential civil war 
researches, namely Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and Fearon and Latin (2003), I show that 
political and economic inequalities between groups actually increase the probability of civil 
conflict. Countries with large groups face economic and political discrimination along ethnic 
lines are more likely to experience internal conflict, as oppose to countries do not discriminate 
against minorities. Lastly, investigating the relationship between third party assistance and the 
risk of civil conflict onset, I use data for U.S. economic and military aid to foreign countries. 
However, the data failed to reach statistical significance. This may be due to lack of data for 
other third parties like the former USSR which actively provided economic and military aid to 
various countries opposing US interests during the Cold War. In the final section, I present a case 
study of the civil war in Iraq and Syria, which created environment for ISIS to emerge. The case 
study provides a brief history about the origin of the group from 2010-14, but the primary goal is 
to provide an explanatory argument of how each of the three mechanisms played out in Iraq and 
Syria’s civil wars respectively. 
	 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II nearly 122 civil wars have resulted in the death of over 16 
million people worldwide, compared with 3 million deaths in interstate wars.1 Internal conflicts 
typically last longer and bring about widespread economic, political, and social devastation--as 
seen in Afghanistan, Sudan, and today in Syria. Despite this heavy toll, civil conflicts have been 
studied far less than conventional wars, and lack of consensus on the conditions that contribute to 
the onset of civil conflict divided scholars into two camps; those who argue that the availability 
of opportunity has a more explanatory power in civil war onset, and those who caution that the 
role of ethnic grievances should not be underestimated. The underlying disagreement is twofold: 
1) whether it is the “opportunity” or “grievances” that increases the risk of internal conflict, and 
2) what constitutes “opportunity” and what constitutes “grievances”.  
 
In light of this argument, this research aims to evaluate three prominent causes of civil 
conflict—state capacity, ethnic grievances, and third party assistance—that most affect the risk 
of civil conflict, with the goal to reconcile these differences. I provide empirical evidence 
suggesting when we introduce the opportunity factors that affect civil war onset, such as state 
weakness, these factors are more likely to produce civil conflict in societies with economic and 
political inequalities between ethnic groups.  
 
One interpretation of “opportunity” is the availability of finance—either to enable 
governments to suppress potential rebel groups or to facilitate rebel activities—that can 
determine the onset of civil conflict. Governments in relatively rich countries can collect more 																																																								
1 This figure is taken from Fearon and Latin’s (2003) article, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”  		
	 2 
revenue and consequently spend more on security, making conflict less likely, while the 
availability of natural recourses that are accessible to rebel groups, in turn finance the activities 
of these groups.  For example, Collier & Hoeffler (2004) argue that people who join rebel groups 
are primarily driven by economic gains and that grievances are largely irrelevant.2 While people 
may be rational actors who calculate costs and benefits of joining rebellion, they are unlikely to 
risk their lives in the absence of severe grievances or some sense of group loyalty that bonds 
them together. Hence, the availability of finance to rebel groups becomes problematic only when 
other conflict-causing elements are present, such as ethnic grievances.  
 
A number of conflict scholars have found ethnic grievances statistically insignificant and 
therefore concluded that ethnic grievances have no, or little, effect on the risk of civil conflict 
onset. For instance, Fearon & Laitin (2003) argue that grievances such as economic inequality or 
government discrimination against minorities are less effective predictors of civil conflict when 
controlling for per capita income.3 Most of these studies have measured ethnic grievances based 
on the size and number of ethnic groups or simply based on language and culture differences. 
The problem with these measurements is that they do not account for the level of economic and 
political inequalities that exist between ethnic groups, which may be the driver of violence.  
 
Differences in access to economic and political resources among ethnic groups provide 
potential dissenters with a strong motive to fight. This is referred to as horizontal inequality and 																																																								
2 Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler (2004) Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563–
595. 
3 Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science 
Review 97(1): 75–90. 	
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suggests that ethnic fractionalization that coincides with economic and political differences 
between groups can cause deep resentment and may lead to violence. Using the Minority at Risk 
(MAR) dataset, I find strong evidence that economic and political inequality between ethnic 
groups does matter, even after controlling for other major predictors of civil war.  
 
There is a wider consensus in the literature with regard to state capacity in sustaining 
peace and stability. Generally, researchers have operationalized the concept of state capacity as 
the state’s military, institutional, and administrative capability (Hendrix 2010).4 The first two 
dimensions of state capacity—military and the institutional quality—have received a great deal 
of attention, but the third dimension to a lesser degree. The state’s administrative quality 
deserves greater attention, given the importance of this dimension in implementing policies that 
directly affect citizens’ daily lives. According to the social contract theory, citizens accept state 
authority as long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic and security 
measures. When the government lacks the ability to do so, the contract breaks down and violence 
becomes more likely.  
 
In an effort to build on the previous literature that emphasizes state capacity in 
understanding domestic conflicts, this paper finds that wealthier states with higher rates of 
taxation and redistribution capabilities have lower probabilities of civil war onset. This is not 
because wealth alone, often measured by per capita income, can substitute for a strong state, but 
states that have higher tax ratio are likely to have more efficient bureaucracy and redistribution 																																																								4	Hendrix, Gullen S. 2010.Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil 
conflict. Journal of Peace Research 47(3):273-285 	
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outcomes, which are associated with the reduction of grievances, and more social stability. 
Furthermore, bureaucratic efficiency is related to a strong military and law enforcement to 
surveillance and counter internal challenges.  
 
Consistent with Fearon & Latin (2003), I argue that financially and bureaucratically weak 
states provide rebel groups with the opportunity to recruit more members of society, thus 
increasing the probability of civil conflict. Such states lack the ability to monitor and identify 
rebel group members within their borders and often conduct poor counter-insurgency operations 
that inflict a heavy toll on civilians, which is likely to drive noncombatants into rebel forces.5 
However, measurement of state capacity with per capita income alone may not reflect the state’s 
ability to maintain a monopoly on the use of force or delivery of services. Per capita income may 
be a good indicator of a government’s coercive capacity and overall economic development, but 
economic wealth alone may not translate into the state’s administrative capacity to implement 
economic and security policies efficiently.  
 
To build on this argument, that economic wealth can substitute the states overall 
administrative and military capacity, I argue that another important indicator for the state’s 
military and administrative capacity is the degree to which the state is able to raise revenue 
through taxation. This is because taxation is not only associated with strong military and 
administrative capacity through revenue increases, but also affects distributional outcomes and 
political stability. Such states have greater ability to provide public goods and collective security 
through a more stable and effective bureaucratic system.  																																																								
5 Note: This paper makes a reference to both Collier & Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon & Latin (2003) in several places. 
This is not just because these works are the most influential and highly cited in recent civil conflict literature, but 
also their arguments are highly immersed in the idea of opportunity, which is relevant to my hypotheses.     
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The third factor that affects the onset and duration of civil conflict is third party 
intervention. The literature of civil war intervention shows the development of various 
theoretical approaches, with some viewing third party intervention as a response to civil war 
conditions; especially conflicts that have ethnic components make intervention more likely 
(Kholsa 1999).6 Others have focused more on the actors involved in civil conflict rather than 
other features of the conflict (Salehyan et al. 2011).7 I hypothesize that when opposing third 
parties with geopolitical interests engage in a country’s internal disputes by providing support in 
the form of military and economic aid, they increase the probability of civil conflict onset. This 
is because such support reduces any prospect for compromise and a negotiated settlement 
between the opposition and the government. I tested this hypothesis using data for U.S military 
aid and economic aid to foreign countries for 160 countries. However, I failed to find a 
significant correlation between third party assistance and civil war onset. This may be due to the 
lack of data for the opposing parties, such as the economic and military support from the former 
Soviet Union to other groups during the Cold War. Other influential intervention studies (for 
example, Regan & Meachum 2013) have found support for the effect of third party intervention 
on the risk of civil war onset. In their analysis, they develop a model that generates a risk score, 
which indicates the likelihood that a country will experience a civil war onset two years in the 
future. The risk scores are predicted based on a forecasting model that includes regime type, 
level of infant mortality, conflict neighborhood, and state discrimination.8 Their sample reflects a 
																																																								
6 Khosla, Deepa. 1999. “Third World States as Intervenors in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and 
International Security.” Third World Quarterly 20 (6): 1143–56. 
7 Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham. 2011. "Explaining External Support for 
Insurgent Groups." International Organization 65.04): 709-44. Web. 	
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set of countries experiencing a level of instability sufficient to put them at a higher risk of civil 
war, but that are not currently at war. One of the limitations of third party studies has been the 
emphasis on intervention after the conflict begins, due to lack of appropriate data. We know that 
the actions of third party actors prior to the conflict onset play an influential role in diffusing or 
exacerbating disputes between the opposition and the government.  
  
This paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly review the literature on determinants of 
civil war, focusing on the “grievances” and “opportunity” model. Then three hypotheses follows; 
the “opportunity” model in terms of state capacity, ethnic “grievances” across groups, and the 
effect of third party intervention in civil war onset. Next, I empirically test the hypotheses using 
cross-national data for over 160 countries. The empirical test supports the first two hypotheses 
with regard to state capacity and ethnic grievances, but the third hypothesis fails to reach 
statistical significance. In the final section, I present a case study of the civil war in Iraq and 
Syria with the focus on the rise of the Islamic State group, also known as (ISIS).  The case study 
provides a brief history about the origin of the group, but the primary goal is to provide an 





8 Regan, Patrick M., and M. S. Meachum. "Data on Interventions during Periods of Political Instability." Journal of 
Peace Research 51.1 (2013): 127-35. Web. 	
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CIVIL WAR DETERMINANTS 
Literature on the study of internal conflict links the onset of civil war to some 
combination of “opportunity” and “grievances”. Traditional researchers have generally focused 
on the question related to group “grievances”, and the role of inequality, discrimination, and 
deprivation in why some groups choose to rebel.  The combination of these three factors makes 
ethnically and religiously polarized societies more prone to civil conflict. Gurr (1970) suggested 
that the potential for collective violence depends on the discontent of the members of society, 
which is the result of gap between expectations and achievements.9 This gap is called relative 
deprivation and provides the motive for action through a “frustration” mechanism. Despite the 
logical appeal behind this argument, a number of scholars have challenged the validity of 
“relative deprivation” in explaining the onset of civil conflict. In part, this is due to the difficulty 
of measuring human frustration statistically (Brush 1996).  
 
The critiques of relative deprivation argue that the existence of frustration and grievances 
is not enough to explain why some groups mobilize against the state. Inequality and grievances 
could only be considered a precondition and not the main driver for the occurrence of social 
unrest.  Rather, they argue, the emergence of social movements is contingent upon the 
availability of resources needed for collective action.  Tilly (1978) argues that collective violence 
is a struggle for power among contending groups; it occurs not when groups are especially 
discontented, but when they calculate that action will be successful, with benefits that exceed the 
costs.10 Therefore, rebel members are “rational actors” who calculate the costs and benefits of 																																																								
9 Gurr, Ted Robert (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.	
10 Tilly, Charles (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.  
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rebellion.  After all, rebel groups need to generate revenue to build a robust organization and 
cover the costs of rebellion.  If the costs of rebellion outweigh the benefits, rebellion becomes 
unlikely regardless of the existence of grievances.  
 
This perspective is called “resource mobilization” theory, which emphasizes the 
continuities between a movement and institutionalized actions, the rationality of movement 
actors, and the strategic problems confronted by movements. Based on this perspective, the 
success of movements is largely determined by strategic factors and the political process in 
which dissenting groups become enmeshed (Jenkins 1983).11 Since then, this argument has 
inspired numerous statistical analyses to explain what types of resources and tactics are 
significant for potential dissent groups to launch an insurgency and overcome the collective 
action dilemma.   
 
State Capacity  
In assessing the explanatory power of “opportunity” versus “grievances” arguments, 
Collier & Hoeffler (2004) find empirical support for the latter, because individuals who decide to 
join a rebellion are more driven by economic benefits than motives, they argue. And, the 
presence of natural resources provides rebel groups with the necessary funds to cover the cost of 
their rebellion. The most significant funding opportunities, they claim, tend to come from 
exportable natural resources: if rebels can extract and sell resources, or extort money from those 
who do, then they are more likely to launch a civil war.  																																																								
11 Jenkins, J. Craig. "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements." Annual Review of 
Sociology 9.1 (1983): 527-53. Web 	
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This argument is more actor-focused and largely undermines other forms of opportunities 
in initiating civil war, such as state weaknesses. Researchers have suggested that opportunity and 
grievances models are not mutually exclusive and civil war should be defined as complex events 
that result from a combination of factors that include grievances and opportunities. In a state 
where grievances are high, mobilization becomes more likely when opportunities arise.  
Opportunity, however, is a not a clear concept; it may come in different forms, such as political 
instability, state weakness, or structural conditions. Opportunities are not only associated with 
the rebel group’s calculations of its own strengths and strategies, but also provide explanations 
for the state’s ability to challenge potential rebellion. Fearon & Latin (2003) identify specific 
factors that increase a state’s vulnerability to insurgency, such as poverty, political instability, 
and rough terrain. These factors matter primarily in the likelihood of civil conflict, because they 
proxy the state’s overall capacity to fight insurgency. At the heart of their argument is that the 
state’s overall economic development determines its coercive ability to find and monitor 
potential rebels through a robust military and police force.  
Fearon & Latin (2003) hypothesize that financially, organizationally, and politically weak 
governments render insurgency more feasible and attractive due to weak local policing and 
corrupt counter-insurgency practices. They measure a state’s administrative and military capacity 
based on economic variables such as per capita income. States with higher per capita incomes 
may have stronger administrative and military capacity, factors that are decisive in deterring 
rebellion from initial stages. Such states are able to monitor and impose necessary sanctions on 
disaffected citizens, should they decide to rebel. Conversely, low capacity states generally lack 
sufficient bureaucratic penetration into the society and sufficient institutions of coercion to carry 
	 10 
out this task, thus facing serious challenges in monitoring and suppressing dissent. This creates 
an environment that is conducive for rebel groups to recruit disaffected citizens into their ranks.  
While state capacity seems to be an intuitive factor that can affect the onset and duration 
of civil conflict, it has been a difficult concept to operationalize (Hendrix 2011; Sobek 2010).12 
Measures such as per capita income can be simplistic and don’t directly reflect the state’s ability 
to administer all of its territory, maintain a monopoly on the use of force, or deliver services. 
Thus, measuring the states’ administrative and repressive capacity with per capita income alone 
may not present an accurate picture of the state’s overall ability to challenge potential dissent.  
Per capita income is an important indicator of a government’s military and economic capacity, 
but economic wealth alone may not substitute for a state’s administrative capacity to implement 
law and order (Zeynap, Dursun, and Patrick 2010). 13  
To build on Fearon & Latin’s argument that economic wealth can substitute for the 
state’s overall administrative and military capacity, I argue that another important indicator for 
the state’s military and administrative capacity is the degree to which the state is able to raise 
revenue through taxation of the population. States have greater ability to provide public goods 
and collective security through a more stable and effective bureaucratic system. Moreover, 
revenue extraction establishes some sense of connectedness between the government and citizens 
through the exchange of goods for protection (Levi 2006).14  However, as predatory theory 
																																																								
12 Sobek, David (2010) Masters of their domains: The role of state capacity in civil wars. Journal of Peace Research 
47(3): 267–271. 
13 Taydas, Zeynep, Dursun Peksen, and Patrick James. "Why Do Civil Wars Occur? Understanding the Importance 
of Institutional Quality." Civil Wars 12.3 (2010): 195-217. Web.	
14 Plous, S. "Of Rule and Revenue. Margaret Levi." (Review).  Ethics 100.2 (1990): 430-32. Web.  
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predicts, rulers face a variety of constrains in raising revenues through taxation, such as their 
relative bargaining positions and the cost of transactions. 
It is argued that interstate rivalries and territorial threats loosen some of these constrains 
on the ruler’s ability to extract revenue from the populations (Gibler & Miller 2014; Thies 
2004).15 In the time of interstate war and rivalries, governments are able to extract more tax 
revenue from their population, and may face less opposition from citizens.  Gibler & Miller 
(2014) argue that the ability of a state to control potential rebellions resides in a combination of 
two factors—the level of connectedness of the state with the population and the repressive 
strength of the government, which is measured by the ability of state to implement its policies, 
by force if necessary. In their estimation, during an external threat to a state’s territorial integrity, 
individuals in the targeted state become more connected with the state and less tolerant of the 
internal rival groups. Thus, they would be more willing to contribute to the state’s defense and to 
central government.16  
 
This hypothesis is originally derived from Tilly’s famous argument “war makes states, 
and states make war”, which is inspired by the European state-building experience during the 
16th century, that suggests that external threats and war that involved territorial occupation 
fostered a sense of national identity and allowed the rulers to extract revenues from society in 
exchange for protection. The theory introduces four steps in the state building process--
																																																								
15 Thies, Cameron G (2004) State building, interstate and intrastate rivalry: A study of post-colonial developing 
country extractive efforts, 1975–2000. International Studies Quarterly 48(1): 53–72. 
16 Gibler, Douglas M., and Steven V. Miller. "External Territorial Threat, State Capacity, and Civil War." Journal of 
Peace Research 51.5 (2014): 634-46. Web. 	
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eliminating rivals outside of territories (war-making), eliminating internal rivals (state-making), 
protecting those parties that support their continued rule, and finally, to accomplish the first three 
activities, states must engage in the extraction of resources from the population and territory they 
are attempting to control.  
 
However, a number of scholars have argued that the European model of state building 
has not travelled well in the post-colonial and civil war-prone developing countries, mainly due 
to the presence of international norms blocking interstate rivalries escalating into actual war and 
territorial expansion.  They argue that great powers combined with international structure have 
prevented the emergence of strong states in the developing world in a manner parallel to that of 
early modern Europe. Following this perspective, Thies (2004) examines the effects of both 
interstate and intrastate rivalries on extractive capacity in the context of state development in 
Sub-Saharan, North African, and Asia. He comes to the same conclusion that the lack of serious 
external threats has led to weak state structures, and in particular inefficient fiscal bureaucracies 
and tax systems.  
 
The studies focus on the effect of the external factors on the government’s ability to 
collect revenue through taxation and they largely ignore the internal factors, such as the 
country’s economic conditions, internal rivalries between groups, the existence of natural 
resources, and the type of government institutions that may determine the government’s ability to 
collect revenue. If the state already suffers with internal rivalries and has weak institutions, 
external rivalries may only present opportunities to the potential dissenters to put more pressure 
on the government, thus leading to more violence and instability. External rivalries are still too 
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common in regions of Africa and the Middle East, but these rivalries have not resulted in less 
internal conflicts and greater national unities. This could be due to the internal factors, namely 
ethnic heterogeneity, colonial history, and the presence of natural resources (Herbst 1990).17 In 
the Middle East, for example, the Arab-Israeli and Iran-Saudi rivalries have not contributed to 
the increase of state capacities for two reasons: first, Middle Eastern societies still suffer with 
identity crises along ethnic, regional, and religious lines due to their colonial history. There is no 
a strong sense of belonging to a particular state among people. Oftentimes, loyalty to certain 
religious or ethnic groups overcomes the sense of nationalism (Razi 1990) 18. The Arab-Israeli 
rivalry has at times created some sense of unity among Arab societies, but this unity was rather 
to serve the authoritarian rulers at times of crisis. The Iran-Saudi rivalry has had serious 
consequences in deepening sectarian divisions and political crises within the countries of Yemen, 
Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. 
Second, most Middle Eastern states heavily rely on oil to generate revenue. There is very 
little reliance on domestic taxation and a lack of transparency and political accountability 
between states and citizens. If the government doesn’t extract revenue from the people and 
instead substitutes revenue from natural resources, the social contract between the state and 
citizens becomes less pronounced (DeRouen & Goldfinch 2012).19 Corrupt leaders share the 
wealth with certain elites to retain power rather than pursue legitimacy through the social 
																																																								
17 Herbst, Jeffrey. "War and the State in Africa." International Security 14.4 (1990): 117. Web. 
18 Razi, G. Hossein. "Legitimacy, Religion, and Nationalism in the Middle East." The American Political Science 
Review 84.1 (1990): 69. Web. 
19 Derouen, Karl, and Shaun Goldfinch. "What Makes a State Stable and Peaceful? Good Governance, Legitimacy 
and Legal-Rationality Matter Even More for Low-Income Countries." Civil Wars 14.4 (2012): 499-520. Web. 	
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contract (Ross 2004).20 Thus a larger percent of the population comes to perceive them as being 
deprived from the country’s wealth. This is even more problematic in ethnically divided societies 
where one ethnic group has dominated the government, which is largely the case in the 
developing countries.  
This is not to suggest that oil-rich states that are ethnically fractionalized are doomed to 
experience internal conflict and are never able to establish an effective bureaucracy. In fact, 
some studies have argued that an abundant of oil revenues enables incumbents to both reduce 
taxes and increase patronage and public goods, making it possible for them to buy off a larger set 
of potential challengers and reduce dissent (Smith 2004).21 However, the prospect of establishing 
an effective bureaucracy that benefits average citizens in such states may be low. In contrast, 
governments that depend on tax revenues are obligated to be more transparent and less corrupt, 
two essential components in building an effective bureaucracy.  
 
 In short, states with higher tax ratios have greater abilities to establish a sufficiently 
bureaucratic system that can facilitate economic growth, reduce the likelihood of corruption, and 
enhance the government’s ability to deliver public goods and provide security, which in turn 
reduces grievances. Conversely, in a state where the bureaucracy and institutions of coercion is 
too weak to provide public goods and collective security, grievances are likely high, thus 
																																																								
20 Ross, Michael L. "How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases." International 
Organization 58.01 (2004): n. pag. Web.	
21 Smith, Benjamin. "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999." American Journal of 
Political Science 48.2 (2004): 232. Web. 	
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increasing the probability of social unrest. This may be more prevalent in ethnically divided 
societies.   
 
Ethnic Grievances  
The proponents of the opportunity model have underemphasized the role of ethnic 
grievances in the probability of civil conflict, and they argue that what matters most for initiating 
rebellion is the availability of opportunities and that motive is not a significant factor. Critics of 
this model have argued that civil conflict could be a combination of several factors that include 
opportunity and grievances. For example, Gurr (2000) reconciles these approaches by combining 
these models, arguing that mobilization depends on availability of collective identity, shared 
motivations and opportunities for collective action.22  
 
Some have argued that the relationship between ethnic grievances and the onset of civil 
conflict should be approached in a way that can account for the level of ethnic grievances among 
groups, the shared identity, and the opportunity is available to them depending on the type of 
political regime and the country’s socioeconomic factors (Ellingsen 2000; Buhaug et al. 2014; 
Kaufmann 1996).23  For a group to mobilize, it first needs a common identity, which is readily 
																																																								
22 Gurr, Ted Robert. Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2000. Print. 
23 Ellingsen, T. "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew?: Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict during and 
after the Cold War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 44.2 (2000): 228-49. Web 
Buhaug, Halvard, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Square Pegs in Round Holes: Inequalities, 
Grievances, and Civil War." International Studies Quarterly 58.2 (2013): 418-31. Web. 
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available among ethnic group members, based on common language, history, and religion. 
Ethnic groups that share fundamental factors like history, beliefs, race, religion, language, or 
homeland often make conflict particularly pervasive and intractable. Kaufmann (1996) claims 
that this identity particularly becomes hardened further by conflict, and any threats to that 
common identity will prompt individuals to support groups claiming to represent their ethnic 
identity.24  A collective identity, however, is not enough for a group to mobilize in the absence of 
severe grievances among the ethnic groups in a given country. Grievances in the form of 
economic and political discrimination directed at certain groups may motivate their members to 
resort to violence. Lastly, to overcome the collective action dilemma, there has to be some form 
of opportunity for the potential dissent group to mobilize. Opportunities for rebellion may be the 
result of government provocation, state weaknesses, and physical conditions, such as geography 
or mountainous terrain (Ellingsen 2000; Fearon & Latin 2003).  
 
The probability of civil conflict when these conditions work together is reflected in 
Ellingsen’s (2000) analysis. Examining the level of ethnic diversity and the probability of civil 
conflict onset, she finds some support for the effect of ethnic diversity on the probability of civil 
war, but concludes that a country’s political regime and socioeconomic level rather than ethnic 
diversity is more significant in predicting civil conflict. Her measurement of multi-ethnicity, 
however, is based on the degree of ethnic fragmentation, the size of the largest minority within a 
country, and ethnic affinities.  Other researches have argued that it is not so much 
																																																								
24 Kaufmann, Chaim (1996) Intervention in ethnic and idelogi- cal civil wars: Why one can be done and the other 
can’t. Security Studies 6(1): 62–100. 
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fractionalization, but rather polarization between two ethnically large groups that increases the 
risk of civil conflict. An ethnically polarized society indicates that there are few groups and that 
they are roughly matched in terms of capability. This makes for a volatile situation of groups 
competing for power and resources. Whereas, an ethnically fractionalized state means that each 
group is too small to have the capabilities to mobilize for rebellion, thus decreasing the risk of 
civil conflict (Forsberg 2008; Bhavnani & Miodownik 2009).25   
 
While some of these authors found a relationship between ethnic diversity and civil 
conflict, other researchers like (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fearon & Latin 2003) find no effect of 
ethnic diversity on the onset of civil conflict. These studies have largely followed the traditional 
way in measuring ethnicity by looking at the demographic size of groups rather than their 
economic and political status as the origin of conflict. Because fractionalization has been seen as 
a proxy for ethno-political grievances, many researchers have concluded that ethnic grievances 
have little or no explanatory power for the onset of civil conflict (Buhaug et al. 2014).  
Furthermore, many of the origins of these arguments have been built on the relative deprivation 
that assumes conflict stems from a gap between rich and poor, and they measured income 
inequality based on interpersonal wealth comparison.  
 
																																																								
25 Forsberg, Erika (2008) Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting. Journal of Peace Research 
45(2): 283–300. 
Bhavnani, R., and D. Miodownik. (2008) "Ethnic Polarization, Ethnic Salience, and Civil War." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 53.1 : 30-49. Web. 
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Cederman & Girardn (2007) echo this concern, arguing that using conventional indicators 
of ethno-linguistic (ELF) index offers little explanation for ethno-nationalist civil wars. Such 
tests assume that violence is primarily a reflection of individual, as opposed to group-level, 
dynamics. Instead, they offer an alternative index exclusion called “N” which deviates from 
standard fractionalization measures by introducing state centric and ethnic configuration by 
populating group level, rather than individual level mechanisms.26   
 
 Another counter argument to the opportunity model is that part of the problem that the 
relationship between ethnic grievances and the probability of civil conflict has not found 
statistically significant is because researchers have tested whether ethnic diversity has a direct 
influence on the probability of civil war onset. Some researches that have tested for conditional 
argument suggest that if we introduce factors that have a direct positive effect on civil war onset, 
these factors are more likely to take hold and produce a civil war in the state with ethnic 
fractionalization. This is because of the social cohesion within ethnic groups, which allows them 
to overcome collective action problems associated with a costly and risky venture such as 
rebellion and provides natural lines upon which the society can split (Blimes 2006).27  
 
Buhaug et al. (2014) argue that measuring ethnic diversity through fractionalization and 
other individual based indices such as, GINI-coefficient rather than group-level grievances has 
been the reason of why most literature on civil war fails to link ethnic division to civil conflict. 																																																								
26 Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girardin. "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist 
Insurgencies." American Political Science Review 101.01 (2007): 173-85. Web.	
27 Blimes, Randall J. "The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War Onset." Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 50.4 (2006): 536-47. Web. 	
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Instead, they argue that group-based analysis underlines socioeconomic marginalization among 
ethnic groups exhibit a positive and statistically significant effect on the risk of civil war.  Ethnic 
grievances is likely to become a significant factor in the onset of civil conflict after we introduce 
the factors that directly affect the risk of civil conflict to societies with great economic and 
political inequalities between groups,  
 
Whether the size of the dominant and dominated, as well as the number of ethnic groups 
in a given country, may cause domestic conflict is largely determined by the level of economic 
and political grievances along ethnic lines, rather than by the size and number of the groups 
itself. Thus, political and economic marginalization among ethnic groups might be a better 
predictor in determining the link between ethnicity and civil war. Because discrimination 
collectively directed against certain ethnic groups might very well encourage its members to join 
the resistance regardless of their own economic and political status, which in turn makes it easier 
for the rebel groups to recruit more members of that disaffected group.  Collective discrimination 
may strengthen the sense of solidarity and identity among members of an ethnic group. As the 
result, they may set aside their individual preferences in favor of their ethnic group’s collective 
interest in order to push back against the opposing groups. In this environment, individuals are 
more willing to make sacrifices on behalf of their group, thus decreasing the problems associated 





THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: STATE CAPACITY 
State capacity as it pertains to civil conflict generally examines military strength, 
administrative capacities, and the quality of the state’s political institutions. The combination of 
these three dimensions determines the states’ ability to achieve collective security.  Strong states 
will not only lower the risk of civil violence through the use of physical coercion, but they are 
able to address the demands of their citizens in ways that reduce incentives for violence  
(Hendrix 2011; Sobek 2010).  
The state’s repressive capacity to deter potential challengers is usually measured by its 
military capability. A strong police and military force is an essential element of government’s 
ability to project its forces across its borders.  Collier & Hoeffler (1998) suggest that militarily 
capable states reduce the opportunity for challengers to form an armed insurgency against the 
state.  A strong military is not only characterized with physical coercion to suppress dissents, but 
it practices a strong counter insurgency in a way to impose the minimum cost on civilians.  This 
is crucial because poor counter insurgency practices render insurgency more feasible and 
attractive. Those include a propensity for brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that helps drive 
noncombatants and locals into rebel forces. Furthermore, since state’s military is the centerpiece 
of the state’s repressive capabilities, rebels factor the size, strength, and skill of the state forces 
into their decision to rebel.  
Alternately, measures of military strength alone may not capture the aspect of state 
capacity that most affects the decision to rebel. More bureaucratically capable states are in better 
positions to provide public services and security measures, which are related to reduction in 
grievances. Citizens in strong states are more able to have their grievances ameliorated or, at the 
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very least, a strong state may be able to limit any escalation of the dissent. This implies that the 
civil-war producing effects of grievances might actually be less in strong states, as oppose to 
weak states (Sobek 2010). Bureaucratic capacity, however, may not only relate to social service 
provision, corruption and economic mismanagement, but a factor that prevents the government 
from being able to monitor its citizens, and determine the identities and whereabouts of potential 
rebels. For example, Fearon & Latin (2003) argue that the state’s military and administrative 
capabilities determine the government’s ability to monitor and suppress dissent before it is 
developed into a full-blown insurgency, because such states are able to collect and manage 
information on potential dissents. Where the state is able to monitor its population, it can control 
and discipline its citizens even without the use of force.  
One perspective on administrative capacity concerns the state’s incentives and abilities to 
extract revenue from society through taxation. This is because taxation is not only associated 
with strong military and administrative capacity through revenue increases, but also affect 
distributional outcomes and political stability. Unlike oil-rich states that have little incentive to 
build the state’s capacity to levy taxes and deliver public goods, or to encourage the growth of 
other economic sectors (Reno 1995), governments that depend on tax revenue must in return 
provide public goods and reasonable security to their citizens through an efficient bureaucratic 
system.28 Those who pay taxes expect in return an efficient service from the government. Levi 
(2006) argues that governmental capacity to extract revenue is enhanced through the 
population’s quasi-volunteer compliance, that is, compliance backed by coercion, but primarily 
motivated by a perception that the social contract is fair. Such dependency between the state and 																																																								
28 Reno, William. "Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone." Trends in Organized Crime 2.4 (1997): 67. Web. 	
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citizens are absent in countries make little effort to collect tax revenues, thus leading to weaker 
bureaucratic system and poor governance. According to Ross, despite their level of income 
would predict, oil-producing countries tend to have weaker state apparatus, because their rulers 
see no need to invest in the bureaucratic capacity to collect taxes. These states became vulnerable 
to rent seeking and unable to develop sound economic policies and effective bureaucracy in a 
way to organize and address the interest of their people.  
The strength and weakness of a state is contingent upon its ability to provide political 
(public) goods to citizens living within its borders. The essence of that political good usually 
implies codes and procedures that together constitute an enforceable rule of law, security of 
property, a judicial system, and a set of values that legitimize and validate the local version of 
fair play. Most importantly, the state’s prime function is to provide the political good of 
security—to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to 
eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent 
crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their 
disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms 
of physical coercion. The delivery of a range of political goods becomes possible only when a 
reasonable measure of security has been sustained (Rotberg 2004: 3-6).29  
These goals—social welfare, peace, and security within a state—may be achievable 
through an effective bureaucratic system, and states with high administrative capacity are likely 
to perform well across these categories. Conversely, States fail to deliver basic public goods to 
their citizenries tend to lose legitimacy and come to be perceived as weak. Poor governance in 																																																								
29 Rotberg, Robert I. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2004. Print. 	
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the form of corruption and weak administration does not only generate dissatisfaction and 
grievances with the existing political system, but also increase the opportunity structure for 
rebellion. Under such circumstances, as the opportunity model suggest, rebellion becomes more 
feasible. Citizens then turn more and more to the kind of sectional and community loyalties, 
transferring their allegiances to group leaders. As the result, confrontation and violence between 
the state and such groups becomes inevitable. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: The probability of civil conflict increases as the quality of governance decreases. 
Ethnic Grievances: Horizontal Inequality  
Civil conflicts are often assumed to be struggles in which some ethnic groups claim to 
restore injustices imposed upon them by some other groups. This doesn’t necessarily mean that 
ethnic grievances always lead to civil war. In fact, ethnic grievances may be present almost 
everywhere to some extend, but have caused civil conflict in fewer places. For “grievances” to 
translate into collective political violence, potential dissent groups must be able to mobilize the 
disaffected groups. This is in line with Tilly’s argument, that postulates that individuals’ 
motivations lead to action when they have access to resources for mobilization; both motive and 
opportunity may be readily available in weak states.  
There are a number of factors that affect opportunities for potential dissents to mobilize 
citizens, some of which relates to the ability of a state to address citizens’ demands or its 
coercive capacity to deter potential challengers. If a state has the ability to address the grievances 
of their citizens in ways that reduce the incentive for political violence, it can limit the ability of 
opposition groups to overcome the problems of collective action.  
	 24 
Ethnic groups are often argued to have more grievances and an easier time mobilizing 
against the state, as opposed to other groups that do not share the same identity. Grievances 
among ethnic groups are more likely, when the country’s political power is divided along ethnic 
lines, ruling elites can disproportionately favor their own ethnic group at the expense of others 
(Denny & Walter 2014).30  Since such groups have stronger social ties and live close together, 
they will have an easier time mobilizing if they face collective discrimination. Thus, decreasing 
the cost of collective action for opposition groups to access materials, manpower, and 
organizational resources to mobilize and recruit members of such groups into their ranks.  The 
stronger the sense of grievances among certain ethnic groups, the more readily the potential rebel 
groups will be able to overcome the collection action dilemma blocking armed resistance. 
 
Putnam’s (2000) social capital theory explains part of the picture for why it is easier to 
overcome the collection action dilemma among the members of the same group.31 The sense of 
common identity among the members of the same ethnic group allows for greater cooperation 
between them reinforced by greater trust due to sharing common culture, language, and norms.  
Collective economic and political discrimination directed against a specific group strengthen this 
sense of identity and sense of belongings to the repressed group paves the way for collective 
action even in the face of serious threat. Shared norms and values also facilitate cooperation 
among members of non-ethnic groups, but this cooperation may not always stand strong in the 
face of serious threat.  
 																																																								
30 Denny, Elaine, and Walter Barbra. "Ethnicity and Civil War." Peace Research 51.2 (2014): 199-212. Web.	
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Economic inequality becomes politically salient, paving the way for social unrest when 
there is deep inequality between groups rather than within groups. (Buhang, Cederman, and 
Gleditsch (2014) present empirical evidence that countries with one or more ethnic groups 
radically poorer than the national average, and countries with large groups discriminated from 
national politics have a significantly higher risk of armed conflict. In contrast, the individual-
level (vertical) grievances in a society, such as the Gini coefficient of income disparity have 
weaker impacts on the risk of civil conflict. A number of contemporary examples from Africa to 
the Balkans to the Middle East support this hypothesis.  For example, much of the violence we 
see today in Burundi is the result of economic and political inequality between the ethnic 
majority of Hutu and minority Tutsi. The key factor of the social unrest in Bahrain during the 
“Arab Spring” was due to inequalities between the Sunni elites, which holds disproportionate of 
the country’s wealth and political power, and the Shiite majority. The substantial economic and 
political exclusion of these groups in their respective countries by comparison with other groups 
may have been one of the major factors in encouraging members of these repressed groups to 
mobilize against their states. In some of these states, public policies were formed to deliberately 
target minorities restricting their political and economic participation in the government leading 
to widespread poverty and underrepresentation among minority groups. Such systematic 
discrimination by dominant groups is likely to face with resistance from the oppressed groups, 
thus increasing the likelihood of civil conflict.  
 
H2: All else equal, the probability of civil conflict increases as the political and economic 
inequality between ethnic groups increases.  
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Third Party Assistance 
Since World War II, The dramatic increase in civil conflicts posed a new challenge to 
domestic and international security. This increase in civil conflict was largely driven by the 
rivalries between the United States and former Soviet Union during the Cold war when both 
sides struggled for spheres of interest and influence around the world. During this time, the 
military and economic support provided by the two major powers to their proxy groups led to the 
onset of civil conflict in places like Vietnam, Korea, and various countries in Latin America.  
Major powers intervened in nearly %40 percent of some 140 civil conflicts between 1944-94 
(Regan 2000). Traditional realists argue that this trend is likely to increase in the post cold war 
area, because major powers posses both the resources and global interest to undertake such 
actions. Neorealist, however, argue that the end of cold war coupled with the emergence of new 
global problems such as the proliferation of ethnic conflicts might result in less intervention by 
major powers due to few strategic interests in third world countries to warrant major power 
interventions. 
Intervention, however, was not limited to major powers. Third party intervention often 
carried out by neighboring countries to support ethnic or religious affiliated groups, or 
destabilize the rival state. Such interventions have had more ethnic characteristics, because of the 
existence of ethnic affinities between the intervener and the target state. Kholsa (1999) finds it 
that neighbors were responsible for over half of the total of 975 interventions in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  One possible explanation, she argues, is that, while territorial boundaries were often 
arbitrarily drawn in most Third World regions in the colonial era, it is in Africa that they are the 
most haphazard. Numerous ethnic groups such as the Tutsis and the Somalis are spread across 
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three or more, often neighboring states. These divisions might make some African governments 
more willing to intervene in neighboring countries in support of their ethnic groups. 
Furthermore, Salhyan et al. (2011) argues that third parties often sponsor opposition groups that 
share their goals, and ethnic ties to the rebel organizations is likely to reduce this concern. In this 
regard, ethnic and religious ties can serve as a screening device when sponsoring states choose 
which rebel groups to support  
Regan (1996) demonstrates that when major powers intervene in intrastate conflicts, the 
effect on the probability of success can be quite significant, when compared to the effectiveness 
of intervention by non-major powers.  For example, he shows that military intervention by a 
major power is more likely to succeed than a military intervention by a minor power.32 Likewise, 
the effect of a major power intervening on behalf of either the government or the opposition 
shows a considerable increase in the probability of success over minor-power intervention. One 
inference is that, under almost all strategies for intervening major powers are considerably more 
likely to succeed than minor powers. This is not surprising considering the resource and power 
major powers posses relative to minor powers. Other researchers conclude that regional 
intervention is likely to increase the duration of the conflict, as their military and economic 
support might not be enough to dramatically tip the balance of power between the opposing 
sides.  
Other researches have focused on the attributes of the actors involved in civil conflict 
rather than the features of the civil war as a whole that make intervention more likely Using 																																																								
32 Regan, P. M. "Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts." Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40.2 (1996): 336-59. Web. 	
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principle-agent framework, Salehyan et al. (2011) show that both rebels and sponsoring states 
evaluate their costs and benefits into their decision whether to support or receive support. 
Sponsoring states want to impose the maximum damage to the rival state with the minimum cost, 
while the rebels want to maximize their resources, but still have autonomy on their own actions. 
They argue that rebels, who are moderately strong, have transitional constituency and who are 
fighting governments that are engaged in an international rivalry with other states are most likely 
to receive external support. Because, such rebel organizations are likely to pose a significant 
challenge to their host state to an extent that justifies supporting them.  
These studies make major contributions in understanding of how and why third party intervene 
into another countries civil conflict, and the consequences of their intervention on the onset and 
duration of civil conflict. However, they do not tell us about the effect of the opposing third party 
intervention in the form of providing military and economic support to the opposing sides of the 
conflict. While some researches have studied the consequence of more than one external actor 
into other countries disputes, they are largely focused on the role of third party in the negotiation 
settlement aspect. Few disagree that civil wars end with the negotiation settlements due to lack of 
information about the resolve, demand, and strength of the other side. For example, Walter 
(2000) argues that since settlement through negotiation is almost impossible to reach between the 
parties of civil conflict, third party intervention is necessary to manage the conflict. She suggests 
that unlike interstate wars, civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlement because credible 
guarantees on the terms of the settlement are almost impossible to arrange by the combatants 
themselves. Negotiations do not fail because indivisible stakes, irreconcilable differences, or 
high cost tolerances make compromise impossible, as many people argue. They do not fail 
because bargains cannot be struck. Negotiations fail because civil war opponents are asked to do 
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what they consider unthinkable. At a time when no legitimate government and no legal 
institutions exist to enforce a contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their 
military forces and prepare for peace.33  
Others like Thyne (2006) dispute this claim suggesting that third party intervention could 
actually introduce more uncertainty to the bargaining situation if it is send in the form of cheap 
signals, thus increasing the likelihood of bargaining failure between government and opposition. 
He demonstrates that during intrastate bargaining, third party signals information about the 
likelihood of aiding either the government or the opposition.34 Such signals introduce more 
uncertainty to the situation because the government may interpret the signals differently than the 
opposition, increasing the likelihood that the opposition makes unacceptable demand to the 
government or leaders of the opposition may use the signals to encourage people to fight when 
the odds of successes are low. That’s why despite the peaceful predictions of bargaining, civil 
wars happen frequently and, once it occurs an end to the conflict through negotiation becomes 
difficult.  
 
In light of these studies, I hypothesize that when more than one third party with 
geopolitical interests engage into other countries civil dispute, they may increase the probability 
of civil war onset. By providing economic and military support to one side or the other, third 
parties reduce the likelihood of peace settlements through negotiation, thus increasing the 
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probability of civil war onset. In an environment of uncertainty about the other side’s strength, 
third party support in the form of economic and military aid introduces more uncertainty to the 
situation. This was a common practice during the Cold War, when the two major powers often 
engaged in proxy wars by providing economic and military support to the opposing parties in a 
number of countries.  
Some interventions have been designed to help one side win the conflict and others have 
been carried out to alleviate humanitarian crisis. The latter is carried out to manage the conflict 
and the intervener’s objective is to stop killing innocent civilians or prevent genocides from 
taking place. Such interventions sometimes has drawn multilateral cooperation and resulted in 
some sort of settlements. Third party engagement into another country’s civil conflict, however, 
was not always an act of goodwill by foreign power, but often driven by self-interest.  
Such interventions whether in the form of direct military intervention, military or 
economic aid generally makes war last longer; the most protracted conflicts are those in which 
both sides are receiving outside support (Regan 2000). Of the 60 percent of post WWII civil 
conflicts that experience intervention, three-fifth involved more than one intervener.35 States 
often pursue interventions as a foreign policy tool in response to either convergent or divergent 
geopolitical and strategic interests of other states. Potential interveners undertake evaluations of 
the changing civil war context, which is constituted not only by ground conditions, but also the 
decisions made by other third parties as well (Findley and Teo 2006).36 Geopolitical interests can 
range from asserting dominance, access to natural resources or protecting ethnic brethren in the 																																																								
35 Regan, Patrick. "Civil Wars and Foreign Powers." (2000): n. pag. Web. 
36 Findley, Michael G., and Tze Kwang Teo. "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-
Centric Approach." The Journal of Politics 68.4 (2006): 828-37. Web. 	
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target country. This type of intervention is argued to exacerbate the scope and duration of civil 
conflict. Conflicts involve more than one outside actors are typically last longer, cause more 
fatalities, and a more difficult to resolve through negotiation. They introduce new actors to the 
conflict with agendas of their own, changing the bargaining dynamic to include both state and 
non-state actors. Thus, third party engagement is likely to increase the likelihood of civil war 
onset, when it involves more than one outside actor with divergent geopolitical interests.  
H3: Opposing third party assistance increases the likelihood of civil conflict.  
Understanding the onset of civil war requires a broad analysis that accounts for the effect 
of “grievance” and “opportunity” on civil war onset. When the two factors work together, they 
create an environment susceptible for political violence. One of the important opportunity factors 
is the state capacity. Grievances may arise as the result of state’s inability to provide a reasonable 
measure of security and political goods; factors that enable rebel groups overcome the problems 
of collective action. In such states, there is typically larger number of disaffected citizens that 
can be recruited by rebel groups, and less government capability to monitor and punish 
dissenters’ activities. Another way the state may contribute to escalation of violence is by 
implementing policies to discriminate against certain groups. Ethnically fractionalized states are 
assumed to be more prone to civil conflict if their governments carry out policies to deliberately 
discriminate against minorities, because opposition groups have easier time to mobilize ethnic 
groups due to social cohesion among ethnic groups. During this period, both opposition groups 
and the government are likely to seek outside support to strengthen their position. Intervention 
by third parties become likely under certain circumstances, such as the existence of ethnic 
affinity or some mutual interest between the intervener and the target state. In the next section, I 
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will perform an empirical analysis assessing the effect each of these factors on the probability of 





To test my hypothesis underlining the three key mechanisms--state capacity, ethnic 
grievances, and third party intervention--on the onset of civil conflict, I use a mixed 
methodology approach of a statistical analysis cross-national data, and a case study of the civil 
war in Iraq and Syria. It is in this setting that provided an opportunity for ISIS to flourish.  The 
case study provides a brief history about the origin of the group, but the primary goal is to 
provide an explanatory argument of how each of the three mechanisms played out in Iraq and 
Syria’s civil war.  
 
I proceed with a statistical analysis using logistic regression with country year random 
effects. I use panel data for years between 1960-99 for 160 countries. Using country year as the 
unit of analysis allow me to measure the determinants of civil conflict within a country 
appropriately. I estimate three models including my primary independent variables and several 
control variables. In the first two models, I exclude either political or economic discrimination, 
due to multicollinearity between the two variables, whereas in the third model I include both 
types of discrimination. The data are obtained from Gibler and Miller (2014) unless otherwise 
noted. My dependent variable—the onset of civil conflict—is dichotomous, coded 1 for all 
country years in which civil conflict started and 0 for all others.  This variable is originally drawn 
from the Correlates of War (COW) project version 4.1 (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).37  They 
define civil war as a conflict that involves fighting between a state and non-states actors who 
seek to take control of the government; killed at least 1,000 people from both sides. Thus, this 
depended variable is the onset of intrastate war for central control in a country year.  
																																																								37	Sarkees, Meredith R & Frank Wayman (2010) Resort to War: 1816–2007. Washington, DC: CQ.	
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 Independent Variables 
I use two variables--the state’s bureaucratic quality and state’s military capacity—to 
measure the state capacity. Both of these will be good indicators to measure the state’s ability to 
counter internal challenges. The strength of state’s bureaucracy, which I call the quality of 
governance, is primarily measured by the state’s ability to extract revenue from the population 
and its overall GDP/per capita. I assume that wealthier states have a stronger military force and 
more professional law enforcement.     
 
States with high bureaucratic performance are able to provide a range of political goods 
and services to their citizens, which are related to the reduction of grievances. High bureaucratic 
capacity is also characterized with less corruption, impartial judicial system, and a strong low 
enforcement, which are crucial elements for a state to counter potential rebellion in its initial 
stages (Fearon & Latin 2003). Furthermore, high bureaucratic performance will increase 
citizens’ support and cooperation to the state, making it more difficult for potential dissent to 
recruit members of such societies. I measure state’s bureaucratic quality based on two indicators: 
GDP/ per capita and state’s ability to raise revenue through taxation. GDP/Capita may have 
some advantages; it is widely available for a large number of countries and it is highly correlated 
with a variety of measures of economic and bureaucratic capacity. I obtained the GDP per capita 
from Miller and Gibler (2014) dataset. As for tax ratio indicator, it severs two purposes: revenue 
increases allow the government to strengthen its military and administrative apparatus, which in 
turn enable the government to provide public goods and collective security to the citizens within 
its borders. Furthermore, it creates a bond between citizens and the state through the exchange of 
goods for protection. This is the state’s ability to extract resources from individuals and groups in 
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society rather than the total revenue of government’s income that includes both taxes and non-tax 
revenue.  It is measured as “total revenue minus non-tax revenue and social security 
contributions divided by GDP” (Thies 2010).38  
 
To test the second hypothesis--the effect of ethnic grievances on the onset of civil 
conflict--I use data from the Minority at Risk (MAR) (Asal, Victor, Amy Pate and Wilkenfeld; 
2008). MAR has collected detailed information on more than 283 politically active communal 
groups at the country level form 1945 to 2006. These groups are either mobilized or 
discriminated against, and thus “at risk”.39 To measure the effect of ethnic grievances on the 
probability of civil conflict onset, I test for the political and economic gap across these groups 
which MAR dataset is appropriate to measure the relationship between groups. This captures the 
idea that collective discrimination directed against members of the same ethnic group, it may 
mobilize collective grievances due to stronger bond and shared identity. The political and 
economic inequalities variables are aggregated on the state level coded on 5-category scale. The 
values range from 0 to 4 with higher values indicates extreme inequalities between groups. 
Countries are coded 4 where public policies are formed to restrict minorities from political and 
economic participation by contrast with other groups.  
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Finally, to test for the effect of third party assistance on the probability of civil conflict 
and under what conditions external actor intervention increases the likelihood of civil war; I use 
the natural log of total economic and military aid from the United States as marked in US dollars 
and updated by Miller & Gibler (2014). On one hand, this is a somewhat reasonable measure 
since the United States has been major provider of economic and military aid to many countries 
since the beginning of Cold War. This should give some insight of whether the third party 
assistance has actually increased the probability of civil conflict during the 39 years period. On 
the other hand, one of the two major powers, the former Soviet Union, also provided economic 
and military support to various groups and governments countering US interests during the same 
period. Nonetheless, there is no available data for USSR’s economic and military aid or any 
other countries.  
 
Control Variables  
To account for other predictors on the probability of civil war, I will control for several 
variables whose omission would bias the results. These variables are mostly taken from the 
literature of state capacity and Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) study of civil war onset and updated and 
expanded by Miller & Gibler. To control for the regime characteristics in a country, I use 
democracy data drawn from the Unified Democracy Score (UDS) project. UDS provides larger 
samples of countries and uses a Bayesian statistical estimate of the level of democracy in each 
country in a given year. In the literature of civil conflict, it is widely assumed that democracies 
and dictatorships experience less civil conflict as oppose to semi-democracy regimes, to control 
for this, I include Gibler & Millers squared score of UDS. Instability is also included to consider 
that instability weakens the state institutions, which in turn paves the way for rebels to engage in 
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political violence. Following Gibler & Miller’s method, a country is considered unstable coded 1 
if it experienced two-standard deviation change in its UDS score over a period of three years 
prior to country year observation.  
 
I also control for a set of variables that is widely cited in Fearon & Laitin civil conflict 
analysis. I control for territorial contiguity because territories separated from the capital by long 
distance are assumed to create conditions that favor insurgency. States are considered as non-
contiguous, coded 1 if they have territories with 10,000 populations separated from the capital by 
land, and 0 otherwise. Also, natural resources are considered to have an effect on the likelihood 
of civil war, because they either provide finance for the rebel groups or they are associated with 
corruption and weak governance. Countries coded oil-rich if they generate more than one third of 
their revenue export from oil.  Finally, the natural log of mountain terrain is also controlled for as 
it is argued to provide insurgents with safe heaven while makes it harder for the government 
forces to find and monitor rebel groups in the mountain areas. Table 1 provides a summary 






Table 1: Summary statistics 
 Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Economic discrimination  
 
1.612 1.684 0 4 
Political discrimination      
 
1.300 1.546 0 4 
GDP/Capita  
 
8.144 1.103 5.139 11.080 
Tax ratio  
 
0.155 0.087 0.002 1.185 
US military aid 
  
7.729 7.773 0 23.075 
US economic aid  
 
11.896 7.980 0 22.340 
Democracy score   
                         
-0.139 0.971 -2.102 2.116 
Democracy score 2    
                 
0.962 0.961 0 4.480 
Instability 
 
0.119 0.324 0 1 
Mountain terrain   
                      
2.119 1.432 0 4.557 
Oil 
 
0.135 0.342 0 1 
Population 
 
9.062 1.465 5.384 14.052 





The results are reported in Table 2. The models include civil conflict onset as the 
dependent variable (COW), ethnic grievances (political and economic discrimination across 
ethnic groups), state’s administrative capacity (GDP per capita and tax ratio), and third party 
assistance (U.S economic and military aid) as the primary variables.  
 
I began the analysis with the test for statistical association between the state’s 
administrative capacity and civil war. I hypothesized that as the quality of governance increases 
the probability of civil conflict decreases. The quality of governance encompasses the state’s 
ability to provide public goods and collective security to citizens within its borders. States with 
strong administrative capacity are able to reduce grievances through the provision of goods and 
services, and they tend to have stronger law enforcement, which is essential in monitoring and 
deterring potential dissent to take up arms against the states. I argued that the state’s overall 
Gross Domestic Products GDP, and more importantly the degree to which a state is able to raise 
revenue through taxation associates with an efficient and effective bureaucratic system and a 
state’s coercive ability.  
 
In Table 2, the results in Models 1 and 3 show a statistically significant relationship 
between GDP/Per Capita and civil conflict. The estimate is negative, as expected, and significant 
at the 0.1 level. This is an indication that wealthier countries are less likely to experience civil 
conflict. This result supports earlier findings and not surprising given the importance of 
economic development for opportunity structure.   
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Table 2: Logistic regression analysis of civil war onset 
 Model 1 (COW1) 
 
Model 2 (COW2) 
 
Model 3 (COW3) 
 
Economic discrimination  0.227** 
(0.091) 
 
 0.238†  
(0.140) 
 
Political discrimination      
 
 0.150†              
(0.087) 
 






-0.246                                                    
(0.195) 
 
-0.325†                                                        
(0.203) 
 
Tax ratio  -5. 222* 
(2.483) 
 
-5.442*                                      
(2.462) 
 
-5.209*   
(2.486) 
 






0.005   
(0.023) 
 






-0.005       
(0.034) 
 
Democracy score                          -1.637***          
(0.576) 
 
-1.563***                
(0.567) 
 
-1.639***                    
(0.577) 
 
Democracy score 2                    -1.570***            
(0.526) 
 
-1.532***           
(0.518) 
 
-1.571***             
(0.526) 
 
Instability 0.909***  
(0.316) 
 
0.947***                           
(0.316) 
 
0.908***                               
(0.316) 
 
Mountain terrain                       0.180†                              
(0.108) 
 
0.193†                       
0.109 
 
0.181†                           
(0.108) 
 
Oil 0.216                                        
(0.481) 
 
0.119                            
(0.480) 
 
0.216                               
(0.481) 
 
Population -0.037                                   
(0.117) 
 
-0.046                          
(0.118) 
 






Intercept                                              















Note: Standard errors are clustered on the country and are noted in parentheses. †p < 0.10 *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, 
***p < 0.001 
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The correlation between tax ratio and civil war is also significant. The relationship is 
negative and significance at the 0.05 levels in all three models. This indicates that as the 
government’s ability increases to raise tax revenue from the population, the probability of civil 
war onset decreases. This makes sense for two reasons: first, taxation increases revenue which in 
turn boosts the government’s administrative, as well as military capacity. States with higher 
revenues are in better positions to invest more in infrastructure, law enforcement, and military. 
Second, unlike dependency on oil revenue that is associated with less government accountability, 
corruption, and patronage (Ross 2015), the government’s ability to extract revenue from citizens 
is conditioned upon its ability to return to society by providing goods and services. Thus, 
taxation is less associated with corruption.40  
 
Examining the relationship between economic and political discrimination on the onset of 
civil conflict. Model 1 shows that economic discrimination between ethnic groups is likely to 
increase the probability of civil conflict. The result in Model 1 reveals the correlation is positive 
and significance at 0.01 levels, indicating that as the economic inequality between ethnic groups 
increases, the likelihood of civil conflict increases as well. As for political discrimination shown 
in Model 2, the relationship is significant at the 0.1 levels. In Model 3, the relationship between 
economic discrimination across groups and the risk of civil war onset is still significant at 0.1 
level, whereas the relationship is no longer significant between political discrimination and civil 
war onset. This is due to high collinearity between the two variables (r=0.74).  Overall, this is an 																																																								
40 Ross, Michael L. "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?" Annual Review of Political Science 18.1 
(2015): 239-59. Web. 	
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important finding given the fact that some influential conflict literature have found very little or 
no effect of ethnic grievances on the onset of civil conflict. For example, the often cited analysis 
of Hoffler & Collier finds that grievances in all forms of political and economic inequalities 
related to ethnic fractionalization is insignificant.  
 
As for the effect of third party assistance on the likelihood of civil conflict, I found no 
significant correlation between third party assistance and civil war. This is not the result I 
expected, but I am not surprised given the fact that there is no data on economic and military 
assistance from the opposing third party, such as former Soviet Union relative to the United 
States during the Cold War. A number of empirical studies (for example Regan 2000, Regan & 
Meachum 2013) have found that almost all internal disputes attract the opposing third parties, 
and the opposing third party intervention increases the onset and duration of civil conflict. This 
was particularly evident during the Cold War era when the United States and USSR engaged in a 
number of proxy wars by providing military and economic aid to the opposing groups of the 
conflicts.  
 
As for the performance of the control variables, democracy and political instability are 
highly significant. Mountain terrain is also significant in the probability of civil war onset. 
Population and territorial contiguity are not important predictors of civil conflict. Finally, Oil 
failed to reach any statistical significance. This is in contrast to a number of civil conflict 
literature associates oil with weak governance and corruption, two indicators that have been 
consistently attributed to civil conflict onset. Some of the findings shown in Table 2 are different 
from Fearon & Laitin’s (2003) results. In their model, for example, population, oil, and territorial 
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contiguity are significant. However, in my findings they show no statistical significance. This 
could be due to the difference in time series; their time frame is between 1945-99, while mine is 
1960-99.  
 
To estimate the probability that a state will experience civil war would change given the 
minimum and maximum change in the variables proxy state’s administrative capacity and ethnic 
grievances, while holding all other variables constant at their mean.  According to Model 3, 
increasing economic discrimination between groups from minimum to maximum results an 
increase in the probability of civil war onset from 0.0016 to 0.0022, which is an increase by 
37.5%. This is consistent with my hypothesis, as the level of economic inequality between 
groups increases, the probability of civil war increases. Similarly, the effect size for the tax ratio 
and GDP are significant on the onset of internal conflict. When the tax ratio is altered from the 
minimum to maximum, the probability of civil conflict decreases by 44% (from 0.0050 to 
0.0022). As for the GDP, increasing the country’s per capita income from minimum to maximum 
reduces the likelihood of civil war by 38% (from 0.0060 to 0.00228).  
 
Overall, the implications of my first hypothesis support previous theories about the 
positive relationship between a more robust economy and higher state capacity. However, this is 
not to suggest wealth alone enhance state capacity in the absence of other measures taken by 
state to establish an effective government institutions. It is important how the state manage its 
wealth in a way to benefit average citizens through an efficient bureaucratic system, otherwise 
wealth may lead to more corruption and economic mismanagement, a recipe for grievances and 
violence. Therefore, measuring the state’s ability to which degree can raise revenue from the 
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population is a good indicator of state’s administrative capacity, because raising revenue requires 
an efficient bureaucracy to organize tax polls, process tax payments and punish those who do not 
pay their taxes. Moreover, higher tax ratio associate with less corruption since those who pay 
taxes expect efficient service delivery from the government.  
 
The results of my second hypothesis that economic and political discrimination across 
groups increase the risk of civil war onset run contrary to the influential analyses of Collier & 
Hoffler (2004) and Fearon & Laitin (2003), which they claim ethnic grievances in the form of 





THE CASE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA’S CIVIL WARS: THE RISE OF THE 
ISLAMIC STATE (ISIS) 
 
I have argued that three key mechanisms—state capacity, ethnic grievances, and third 
party assistance—are important factors in explaining the onset of civil conflict. The first 
hypothesis, which suggest that states with low governance quality are more prone to civil 
conflict, have been tested and supported by statistical data analysis. Similarly, the second 
hypothesis that underlines the effect of political and economic inequality between ethnic groups 
on the onset of civil war is statistically significance. However, the third hypothesis that concerns 
with the role of third party intervention in the probability of civil conflict has failed to reach the 
statistical significance. In this section, I intend to provide an explanatory argument by 
underlining the role of the three mechanisms in the case of Iraq and Syria’s civil war, which led 
to the rise of the Islamic State group, known as (ISIS). I primarily focus on the years between 
2011-2013 when the Iraq’s second Sunni resurgence and the Syria’s civil war presented ISIS 
with an opportunity to flourish. I begin with a brief background about the Islamic State group, 




In the wake of US-led invasion of Iraq, thousands of local Sunnis and foreign fighters 
joined by Saddam Hussein’s former loyalists rallied behind a Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi.  Zarqawi’s group (Monotheism and Jihad group) stood out as the most ruthless Sunni 
extremist group fighting U.S forces and attacking Shiite civilians in an attempt to foment a 
sectarian civil war. In 2004, Zarqawi formally swore allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and 
changed the group’s name to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). That same year, the US State Department 
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published a letter Zarqawi wrote to the al Qaeda leadership articulating his plan to attack Iraqi 
Shiites with the aim of igniting sectarian. Shortly after the publication of this letter, Zarqawi’s 
group staged a series of bomb attacks on Shiites celebrating the “Ashura” holiday, killing at least 
185 people.41This led to a bloody sectarian war that claimed tens of thousands of lives from both 
sides. Following the death of Zarqawi by a US airstrike in 2006, the group declared itself as the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). At the peak of Iraq’s civil war in 2006-2007, the ISI emerged as the 
leading force among the Sunni militant groups.  
 
However, the ISI’s increasing indiscriminate attacks against civilians including the Sunni 
population led many local Sunni militants to defect it. The U.S command in Iraq saw this as an 
opportunity to formulate a resistance movement from the Sunni tribes against ISI. Sponsored by 
the U.S forces, the Sunni tribes in Iraq’s Anbar province formed the “Awakening” movement to 
fight ISI and maintain security in their areas. An American counter-insurgency operation 
enforced by a surge in US troops along with the Sunni tribal uprising in Anbar successfully 
drove out ISI in the Sunni provinces of Iraq.42  Over several years, the group suffered a huge loss 
of leadership; most were killed in US air strikes. By 2011, ISI was reduced to underground 
isolated cells without central command structure.  
 
How did ISI manage to resurface from a few isolated cells to an organization that no 
longer just considered a terrorist group with dozens of fighters attacking government forces and 
																																																								41	Hunt, Emily. "Zarqawi's 'Total War' on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide among Sunni Jihadists." The Washington 
Institute. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 15 Nov. 2005.Web.     
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/zarqawis-total-war-on-iraqi-shiites-exposes-a-divide-
among-sunni-jihadists  42	Hasan, Shafqat. "Examining the Causes of the Islamic State’s Resurgence in Iraq." Tarirsouri. 1 June 2014. Web.  
http://tahrirsouri.com/tag/islamic-state-of-iraq-and-sham/  
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civilians, but a group that functions like a state controlling large swathes of territories within two 
states and maintaining extensive military capabilities? The central debate surrounding this 
question has since dominated journalistic analysis as well as a few scholarly articles. Most of 
these analyses have rightly attributed the rise of ISIS to the host of issues, such as the US-led 
invasion of Iraq, Iraqi government’s discriminatory policies toward the Sunnis, regional rivalries 
between Saudi and Iran, and the Syrian civil war. In the following sections, I present an analysis 
focusing on the internal challenges, such as the quality of governance and decades of political 
and economic discrimination between the ethnic groups in Iraq and Syria, as well as the role of 
the regional powers. All of these, especially in the case of Iraq, weaken the state to deter internal 
challenges.  
The second phase of ISIS resurgence begins with the second Iraq’s Sunni uprising in 
2011 when tens of thousands of people across Sunni provinces poured on the streets demanding 
an end to corruption and political and economic marginalization against the Sunni community.43  
The Iraqi security forces responded to the protests with the use of excessive force, resulting the 
death of many protesters. A reinvigorated ISIS and other insurgent groups took advantage of the 
situation. They began attacking Iraqi security forces and other government institutions. The 
popular discontent against discrimination and corruption turned into a full-blown insurgency in 
many parts of the country. In this period, ISI was able to defeat the incompetent Iraqi security 
forces in Anbar province and took control of the region.  
Meanwhile, the Syrian popular uprising against the President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime 
gradually turned into an armed conflict in mid 2011 presented ISI with another opportunity to 
																																																								
43 Sly, Liz. "In Iraq, a Sunni Revolt Raises Specter of Civil War." The Washington Post, 6 Jan. 2014. Web. 
Https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-iraq-a-sunni-revolt-raises-specter-of-new-war.   
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expand its influence and territorial control.  ISI began sending recruits and financial support to its 
fellow jihadi group Jabhat Nusra (JN) in Syria. During the first year of its formation in early 
2012, the JN emerged as the most powerful Sunni militant group among the Syrian opposition. 
Joined by thousands of Sunni foreign fighters, the JN made significant military advances against 
the Assad forces from several fronts. A flow of cash and support from private donors and the 
Sunni sponsor states like Saudi Arabia enabled the group to provide humanitarian aid in the 
rebel-held areas wining the hearts and minds of the locals. Popular support for JN was so high 
that following the US designation of the group as the terrorist organization due to its link to al 
Qaeda protest broke out across Syria on their behalf, with people shouting slogan, “we are all 
Jabhat Nusra” (O’Bagy 2013).  
 
In 2013 the Islamic state of Iraq (ISI) entered the Syrian civil war and rebranded itself as 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Its leader, Abubr al-Baghdadi, unilaterally declared the 
merger of the two groups. This declaration was strongly rejected by the JN leadership insisting 
their operation and approach to politics was grounded in the Syrian identity. Initially, the ISI 
operatives faced opposition from the other armed groups when they attempted to take a place in 
Syria, but their financial assets from illegal oil sale, taxation, and private donations enabled it to 
recruit more fighters and obtain more weapons. In a matter of months, ISIS took over one third 
of the Syrian territories from the government forces and other rebel factions. In its July report, 
the Institute of Islamic Strategic and Socio-political Affairs (IISA 2014) published that ISIS has 
been able to carve out space through filling the vacuum left by the collapsed state. In the areas 
where the government forces have been withdrawn or the opposition groups have failed to 
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maintain their presence, ISIS has quickly stepped in to provide salaries, establishing courts, 
running bakeries and enforcing laws. 
 
ISIS’s military achievements in Iraq and Syria have not only led to an influx of foreign 
fighters to join the group, but also helped ISIS to establish legitimacy to become the leading 
jihadist organization that was once enjoyed by Al-Qaida. After, the fall of Mosel to ISIS in 2014, 
more than a dozen of Islamic extremist groups, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, 
have abandoned Al-Qaida to pledge allegiance to ISIS.  
According to a report from the Foreign Affairs magazine, in November 2014, Ansar Beit 
Al-Muqadas, a Sunni militant group that operates out of the northern Sinai Peninsula, pledged 
allegiance to ISIS and its leader.44This alliance will give ISIS an access to several Sunni militant 
groups in North and sub-Saharan Africa. With dozens of supporters and sympathizers in Algeria, 
Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia, ISIS is poised to transform this massive area, 
drawing support from alienated citizens fed up with autocratic regimes. Territorial Control has 
also given ISIS the advantage to extract financial resources from oil production, taxing local 
citizens, ransom, and looting.  
This kind of finance source has made it more difficult for the United States and the 
international community to effectively reduce the group’s coffers. Although, the long term 
prospect for ISIS to effectively maintain that economic activities and translating it into military 
power might be poor, given that ISIS is an extractive entity (Hansen and Lewis 2015), the longer 
the group maintains its control over these resources, the harder becomes to defeat ISIS militarily.  
																																																								
44 Al-Anani, Khalil. "ISIS Enters Egypt." Foreign Affairs. N.p., 2014. Web. 26 Oct. 2016. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-12-04/isis-enters-egypt   
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Like a state, ISIS has also established a bureaucracy in the territories under its control. 
Newly obtained documents published by the Guardian newspaper suggest that hundreds of ISIS 
cadres have set themselves to work creating rules and regulations for daily activities, as well as 
establishing 16 centralized departments including one for pubic health and natural resources that 
overseas oil and antiquities.45 Finally, ISIS has been very successful in utilizing social media and 
Internet webs to recruit supporters. In addition to establishing several accounts offering religious 
education and combat training to potential supporters around the globe, ISIS targets Arab youth 
by publishing pictures and videos to illustrate the brutality of the Arab regimes that needs to 
come to an end with the help of both local and global potential members (Shamieh & Szenes 
2015).  
Unlike several Islamic armed groups, ISIS has taken lethality into a new stage by 
committing mass execution, suicide attacks, possible genocides against non-Muslim minorities, 
and enslaving women and children.  Some of ISIS’s violent actions are seen as an extension of 
Zarqawi’s brutal methods at the early stages of insurgency in Iraq. After all, ISIS is an evolution 
of Al-Qaida’s Jihadist ideology. Explaining why some Islamist terrorist groups are more lethal 
than others, Piazza (2009) argues that Islamist terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaida tend to be 
more lethal, whereas Islamist armed groups that are categorized, as “strategic” with local 
constituency are less lethal. This is primarily due to the differences in their broader goals and 
constituency concerns.  
 
Al-Qaida and its affiliates are less concerned about a particular constituency in achieving 
their broader goal, which is driving out the western occupation in the Muslim countries and 																																																								
45 Malik, Shiv. "The Isis Papers: Behind 'death Cult' Image Lies a Methodical Bureaucracy." Theguardian (2015): n. 
pag. Web. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/07/isis-papers-guardian-syria-iraq-bureaucracy  
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establishing an Islamic state in the Muslim world. In contrast, strategic groups like Hamas in the 
Palestinian territories has a much more limited goals such as liberating certain territories, 
overthrowing a specific government, and creating an independent state. ISIS seems to be the 
combination of both strategic and universal. While ISIS like Al-Qaida uses terrorism tactics to 
send signals to a broader audience around the world, the group has also been working toward an 
immediate goal by establishing an Islamic state in the territories under its control, running 
bureaucracies, and engage in a more conventional warfare with its enemies. In line with Asal & 
Rethemeyer’s (2008) analysis, the lethality of the group might be more the consequence of the 
combination of territorial control, organizational capital, and religious ideology.     
 
To conclude, what ISIS has achieved in a short period is far beyond of what Al-Qaida has 
ever achieved since its inception almost three decades ago. The answer to this question lies in the 
availability of opportunities presented by the state weaknesses and decades of political and 
economic grievances along sectarian line in both Iraq and Syria, as well as the role of third party 
in the region.  
Iraq’s Civil War 
As violence spiked in Iraq’s capital city of Baghdad in 2006, the Bush administration 
engaged in a semantic war with the American Media over whether the conflict in Iraq is 
appropriately described as a civil war. The death toll was already rising by thousands of fatalities 
had long surpassed the 1,000 battle threshold that would qualify it as a civil war. Primarily, civil 
war in Iraq began as urban guerrilla warfare struggled by Sunni insurgent groups hoping to drive 
out the United States and to regain the power held by Sunnis under Saddam Hussein. It escalated 
in 2006 with the proliferation and intensification of violence by the Shiite militias, who 
	 52 
ostensibly sought to defend Shiite ethnic groups from the Sunni insurgents and who pursued this 
end with ethnic cleansing and a great deal of gang violence (Fearon 2007).46  
 
In the aftermath of 2003 war led by the United States, Iraq’s state capacity has 
dramatically declined. The state lacked an effective bureaucratic system to provide basic goods 
and services immediately resulted in demonstration across several Iraqi cities demanding the 
basic services such water and electricity. Moreover, in the absence of strong law enforcement 
and military forces, the state failed to effectively police and monitor its borders, leaving it 
vulnerable to infiltration by thousands of former jihadist foreign fighters.47 As the result, the 
country became the hub for many veteran jihadists, who previously fought the Russian invasion 
in Afghanistan. The combination of local resentment and an influx of foreign fighters created a 
recipe for internal conflict.  
 
The inability of the government to address the citizens grievances, as the result of a weak 
bureaucratic system, ineffective law enforcement and judicial system provided the opportunity 
for the armed groups to recruit members of various communities into their ranks for financial 
gains. Most importantly, the decision made by the head of U.S interim administration in Iraq, 
Paul Bremer to dissolve the Iraqi army had arguably accelerated the recruitment process by the 
armed groups. The disbanded of Iraqi military left tens of thousands of former Iraqi soldiers and 
officers with no job, making them more susceptible to join the Sunni insurgency. 48 
																																																								46 Fearon, James. "Iraq's Civil War." Foreign Affairs 86.2 (2007): 2-15. Web. 24 Oct. 2013. 
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https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37095.html 	




Although, Iraq began rebuilding its security apparatus slowly, and held its first free 
election in 2005, the newly formed government was not able to make any significant progress 
toward achieving prosperity and security due to power struggle between the ethnic Shiite 
majority, Sunnis and the Kurds. Like many countries in the Middle East, Iraq is divided along 
sectarian, ethnic, and regional lines, which they have deep suspicions toward each other. After 
the fall of Ottoman Empire, the French and the British formed the contemporary Middle Eastern 
states in a way that best served their own national interests, rather than the interest of the locals. 
Within these newly created states, different ethnic, religious and national groups were clubbed 
together into one state, or the same national group was divided among different states 
(Kumaraswamy 2006). 
Each state was confronted with the problem of defining their national identity. To 
overcome this identity crisis, some of the secular Arab rulers in the 1950s advocated for pan-
Arabism, which referred to a unified Arab country in the Middle East and North Africa that 
strongly opposes foreign intervention. The Arab defeat of 1967 war marked the decline of pan-
Arabism and the resurgence of pan-Islamism, which advocated for the unity of Muslims under an 
Islamic state. This period had seen the gradual radicalization of the region and the proliferation 
of various Islamic armed groups that posed direct challenges the state authorities in various 
countries of the Middle East. Meanwhile, the presence of Islamism has provided the Middle East 
and North African authoritarian regimes necessary conditions to further strengthen their state 
capacity and deter any popular mobilization for political reform. Often times, strengthening state 
capacity in the Middle East was rather consolidating power into the hands of one ethnic group by 
repressing the dissents and minorities. This was the case in most of the Middle Eastern countries, 
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especially in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, Hussein’s three decades rule of repression against the Shiite 
and Kurdish further widened the gap between the county’s ethnic groups.  Similarly, Hafiz Al-
Assad’s Alawite regime in Syria had brutally repressed the Sunni majority depriving them from 
political any participation.  
 
Meanwhile, the threat of Islamism and oil forced the West to continue supporting the 
authoritarian regimes of Middle East.  Thus, much of the secular and educated elements of the 
middle class has deterred from mobilization for political reform due to the presence of 
nondemocratic Islamic threat (Bellin 2004). 
 
While the overthrown of Hussein’s regime marked the end of decades of discrimination 
against the Iraqi Shiite majority and the Kurds, it has unleashed the Pandora’s box that would 
pave the way for a long political instability and sectarian conflict in the country. Rather than 
using the opportunity to create a comprehensive, democratic government, the Shiite-led 
government used the occasion to redress the past injustices by attempting to exclude 35 percent 
of the Iraqi population from the economic and political process. Thus, the Shiite central 
government failed to deliver another essential components of the political good, that is free and 
open participation in the political process, respect and support for national and regional political 
institutions, and tolerance of dissent and differences.  
In the dawn of U.S troops withdrawal in 2011, the PM Nuri Al-Maliki’s Shiite 
government began to intensify its repressive policies against the Sunni communities by 
imprisoning hundreds of Sunni dissents under the pretext of anti-terrorism measure and de-
Ba’athification law. He took over all of the key security positions, purging its competent 
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elements in favor of people loyal to him and supplemented with sectarian Shiite militias (Crisis 
Group 2014).49  The Sunni Awakening militias that played a significant role in driving out the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was prevented from integrating into the Iraqi security forces out of fear 
that they would create a parallel military structure that would present an armed Sunni opposition. 
The government institutions including the judiciary system were heavily politicized in favor of 
the incumbent Maliki.  
 
As the economic and political marginalization against the Sunni community was 
increasing toward the end of 2011, the eruption of another civil war was becoming more likely. 
The Iraq’s Sunni community saw Maliki’s policies as an attempt to further repress and isolate 
them. The Sunni tribes developed animosity towards the central government. The weakened 
militias and marginalized Sunni population presented an opportunity for Islamic State of Iraq and 
other terrorist groups to regain influence by exploiting the Sunni grievances.  
 
Maliki’s repressive policies to further marginalize the Iraqi Sunnis led to pockets of 
demonstration in the Sunni city of Fallujah. The protests quickly spread across Sunni regions of 
Iraq and joined by hundreds of thousands of Sunnis protesters demanding an end to political and 
economic marginalization toward the ethnic Sunni community. This period of turmoil provided 
an opportunity for ISIS to grow by recruiting many disaffected members of the Sunni 
community. Although many Sunnis later deny any affiliation to ISIS due to the ruthlessness of 
the group, the Iraqi Shiite government’s implementing policy of discrimination toward the 
Sunnis as the result of the institutional incompatibility and sectarian divisions, led the Iraqi 																																																								
49 Middle East briefing N38."Iraq’s Jihadi Jack in the box." International Crisis Group, 20 June 2014. Web. 
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Sunnis to accept ISIS as an alternative. The quick spread of the protests and the growing 
insurgencies against the Shiite government of Baghdad was evident that the members of the 
Sunni community were driven by the sense of strong grievances along ethnic line.  
 
Meanwhile the Iraq’s neighbors, notably the Sunni Gulf states led by Saud Arabia and 
Shiite government of Iran, were playing an active role in the developments behind the scene. The 
Iranians were providing political and military support to their Shiite brethren in Baghdad in their 
fight against Sunni insurgency.50 After the resurgence of ISIS and the withdrawal of US troops in 
Iraq, the Iranian government stepped up their support to the Iraqi government by sending 
military advisors and soldiers to fight ISIS along the Shiite militias and the government forces. 
To confront the Iran’s dominance in the newly created Shiite government in Iraq and its broader 
hegemonic ambition in the Middle East, the Saudis began to openly support the Iraq’s Sunni 
factions with the hope to undermine the Iraq’s Shiite government and the Iranian dominance in 
the country. The two countries’ proxy war in Iraq reached its peak during the Shiite-Sunni civil 
war in 2006, when the Sunni insurgency led by Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), ISIS’s predecessor, 
directed most of its attacks against the Iraq’s Shiite militias backed by Iran, the Shiite population 
and their holy shrines.  
 
The Iranian-Saudi rivalry began with the creation of the first Shiite state in the wake of 
Iranian revolution in 1979 that generated new challenges for the Sunni states in the Middle East, 
notably Saudi Arabia. The Iranian Shiite leaders began openly questioning the religious 
legitimacy of Saudi Sunni and accused them of being an agent of the West in the Gulf. Ever 																																																								
50 Kim, Ghattas The. "The Saudi Cold War With Iran Heats Up." Foreign Policy - Comments. N.p., 15 July 2015. 
Web. 26 Oct. 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/15/the-saudi-cold-war-with-iran-heats-up/  
	 57 
since, the two countries have been locked in a “cold war” with each other using the sectarian 
divide to further their ambitions in the region. The transformation of Iran into a Shia power 
induced Saudi to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabi ideology that is antagonistic to Shia 
Islam. Many of the groups responsible for the sectarian violence that has occurred in the region 
since 1979 revolution can be traced back to Saudi and Iranian sources. This regional rivalry has 
ramped up after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, which resulted in the establishment of the first 
Arab Shiite state. 51 The liberation and empowerment of Iraq’s Shiite majority after the US 
invasion was the beginning of a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian balance in Iraq 
and the Middle East for years to come (Nasr 2006).  
Syria’s Civil War 
The conflict in Syria began as a protest against the corruption, lack of economic 
opportunities, and repressive political system that have been accumulating over decades; 
encouraged by the wave of protests in the Arab world “, the Syrian people in 2011 began 
peaceful demonstrations demanding radical economic and political reforms in how Syria was 
governed. The lack of response to these demands was followed by severe and sustained military 
action against those who protested, and this violence drove some in the opposition to seek help 
from foreign governments in the region, namely the Sunni Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. 
Many of these governments are keen to shatter the age-old alliance between Syria and Iran, and 
the fall of the Assad regime would help them greatly; for this reason, they offered military and 
financial aid to the opposition, but only on the condition that the “new Syria” would cut links 
																																																								51	Walker, Martin. "The Revenge of the Shia." The Wilson Quarterly (1976) 30, no.4 (2006): 16-20. Print. 
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with Iran and with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. The Iran-Syria alliance, as some assume, roots 
in their common Shiite identity. Iran has backed Syria because both ruling cliques claim affinity 
with the heterodox Shia who are minority in an Islamic world and populated by orthodox Sunnis. 
But this alliance drives less from spurious religious ties than it does from geopolitical interests. 
Iran’s main goal is to shrink the influence of the Sunni pro-western states. Therefore, Iran needs 
all the allies that it can find to ensure that its regional interests are protected.52  
As the Syrian unrest escalated into armed conflict, this new sectarianism spread; it 
became popular because it legitimized violence against others – even those who were not part of 
the regime. The regime’s acts of war against its own people across Syria only encouraged further 
resentment against the regime and the Alawites, a Shiite ethnic minority to which the President 
Bashar Al-Assad’s family belongs. Syria is a majority Sunni Muslim country, but the top 
positions in the security apparatus are in the hands of the Alawites. While, the root cause of the 
conflict in Syria was not primarily driven by the presence of ethnic diversity, ruling the country 
by an ethnic minority who monopolized all the economic and political aspects of the country 
added to the resentment and frustration among the Sunni majority. 
 
Like Iraq, Syria's borders were invented in large part by French colonialists, forcing 
together several disparate groups. After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, and out of its ruins 
France took control, roughly in 1920, of a stretch of Ottoman territory on the eastern 
Mediterranean, today known as Syria and Lebanon. This territory was, and remains, quite 
ethnically and religiously diverse. The French colonialism set up modern-day Syria in a way that 
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contributed to tension between ethnic and religious groups, which eventually became important 
for today's war. When the French took over, the Alawite minority who were long prosecuted by 
the Sunni majority joined the French colonial authority. In particular, they joined the new 
constructed Syrian military—a development the French welcomed as a means of cementing their 
power. European colonialists often promoted minority groups that would rely on them to 
maintain power, so the relationship was symbiotic. After the French left, the Syrian military took 
over in 1963 and the government quickly became dominated by the Alawites. The rule of the 
Alawite coupled with the state of emergency that had been in place since 1963 had decisively 
alienated the Arab Sunni majority.53 
 
Unlike Iraq, Syria was not a weak state. It had a strong security apparatus that 
monopolized power over its territories, and had institutions that to some level was capable of 
providing public services and collective security to Syrian citizens. However, like the rest of 
Arab world that has experienced the “Arab Spring”, decades of sever economic and political 
inequalities between groups coupled with weak economy and widespread corruption in both 
public and private sectors led to social unrest. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the country’s ethnic 
divisions, the regime’s brutal response to peaceful demonstrations, and the involvement of third 
parties, played a vital role into quickly turning peaceful protests into a civil war. The Syrian civil 
war is now a multifaceted conflict with many moving parts. These moving parts are just more 
than an insurgency between a rebel group and the government. It has ethnic tensions, the 
introduction of world and regional powers, and terrorism. 54 
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Two indicators associates with state capacity—military capability, and the quality of 
governance—had mixed results in the pre Syrian civil war. The former is defined as the state’s 
repressive capacity to deter potential challengers, and the latter measure the government’s ability 
to provide public services, which is related to the reduction of grievances. Prior to 1970 when the 
first Assad regime established, Syria experienced a serious of political turmoil as the result of 
power struggle between the contending groups, the Sunni majority and the Alwite minority. 
When Hafz Al-Assad assumed power in 1971, he focused on establishing a strong military, 
which eventually was instrumental in cracking down the Muslim brotherhood popular uprising, 
particularly in the city of Hama in 1982. 55 For some years, Assad managed to contain the 
discontent—partly by granting subsidies on food and partly by curbing the already-hated 
political police—but the fundamental issue was no resolved. Prior a decade to 2010, the Syrian 
economy made some progress, but the regime struggled with a number of interrelated political 
and economic challenges, such as the decrease in oil reserves coupled with an ongoing drought 
and mismanagement of water supply system that has led to dislocation and migration of 
hundreds of thousands of people from the countryside to under-serviced cities. 56 Moreover, 
decades of rent seeking and patronage created an economy were largely dependent on state 
subsidies. It became clear if the government were to maintain social and political stability, it 
needed to make radical changes in its economic and administrative structure. But, the existing 
government institutions and agencies lacked the capacity to implement a sound economy to deal 
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with these challenges. According to media sources, the subsequent Assad regimes focused most 
of their energies on foreign politics due to the ongoing conflicts with Lebanon and Israel, and left 
Syria to be run mainly by members of his family and the intelligence services. 57 As time went 
on, corruption became deepened, creating a new upper class of people close to the Alawite ruling 
family and the Sunni majority who made up the lower and middle class felt deprived from 
economic and political participation, fomenting anger and hostility toward the regime and 
towards the Alawites in general. When the opportunity arose during the wave of the “Arab 
Spring”, the Syrian people whom largely made up of the Sunnis took to the streets demanding an 
end to corruption, economic and political discrimination against them. On one hand, decades of 
economic and political discrimination against the Sunni community made it easier for the 
opposition groups, and later the Sunni insurgency to garner large support among the Syrian 
Sunni community.  On the other hand, the overwhelming support to the Sunni opposition groups 
mostly from the Sunni Gulf states and from the international community emboldened the 
opposition groups to respond to the compromises that Assad regime made from the beginning, 
thus leading to escalation of armed conflicts.  
 
  




In this paper I argued that three key mechanisms—state capacity, ethnic grievances, and 
third party intervention—affect the probability of civil conflict onset. I provided empirical 
evidence that poor governance increases the probability of civil conflict onset by limiting the 
state’s ability to provide public goods and collective security. Conversely, States with strong 
bureaucratic capacity are more capable in addressing citizens’ grievances, thus decreasing the 
probability of civil conflict. Furthermore, bureaucracy may not only relate to social service 
provision, corruption and economic mismanagement, but also a factor that determines the 
government’s ability to monitor and identify potential rebel groups before it is developed into a 
full blown insurgency.  
 
Most importantly, I found that economic and political inequalities across ethnic groups 
(horizontal) have strong effect on the risk of civil war onset. This suggests that economic and 
political disparities increase the probability of civil war when they coincide with ethnic 
fractionalization.  Although, this is not a new finding, as the idea of horizontal inequalities have 
been the focus on several studies in civil conflict research, this finding is nevertheless important 
for two reasons; first, the relationship between ethnic cleavages and civil war should be studied 
based on group level rather than individual level. Measuring ethnic grievances based on 
linguistic and cultural differences does not tell us much about the level of economic and political 
inequalities between groups. Second, this paper reconciles the “opportunity” and “grievances” 
model, suggesting that both ideas are not mutually exclusive, and complement each other.  
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Lastly, I hypothesized that third party assistance in the form of military and economic aid 
to the opposing sides of the internal dispute increase the likelihood of civil war onset. Following 
the literature focus on the effect on third party intervention on the prospect of negotiation 
settlement, I suggested that when the opposing third parties with geopolitical interests provide 
economic and military support to either the government or the opposition, they increase the risk 
of civil conflict onset. Providing economic and military aid to both rebels and government risks 
any prospect for peace settlement through negotiation and help both sides to sustain their war 
once the conflict began.  
 
To test this hypothesis, I failed to find any significant relationship between the third party 
assistance and civil conflict onset. The correlation between third party intervention and civil war 
onset has been found in several studies (for example Regan & Meachum 2013). Empirical 
evidence has shown that third party intervention has led to the onset of civil conflict in several 
countries such as, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Ghana. During the Cold War, both major powers, 
the United States and former Soviet Union provided military and economic aids to many of their 
proxy groups around the world. Yet, data is only available for the United States’ economic and 
military aid to foreign countries. This can impede in finding any significant relationship between 
third party assistance and the risk of civil war onset. Different statistical analysis and more data 
might produce different results.  
 
In the last section, I present a case study of civil war in Iraq and Syria, analyzing each of 
the mechanisms that effect the civil war onset in both countries. In the case of Iraq, the dramatic 
decline in state capacity after the US-led invasion in 2003 coupled with sever economic and 
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political discrimination against the Sunni minority played a significant role in the onset of 2006 
sectarian war and the second Sunni uprising of 2012.  Prior, during and after the conflict, Iran 
and the Sunni Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia continued to paly an active role by providing 
political and economic support to insurgent groups and the government.  In Syria, decades of 
economic and political discrimination against Sunni majority paved the way for the 2011 unrest 
instigated by the popular “Arab Spring”. Although, the state capacity was relatively strong, the 
government’s use of excessive force to put down the protests drove many Syrians to take up 
arms and join Sunni insurgency.  
 
Syria became another arena for the Iran-Saudi rivalry. The Iranian began to support the 
Assad regime with arms and soldiers on the ground, while the Saudis and other Gulf states 
provided arms and financial aid to the Sunni opposition groups. As the result, ISIS is emerged. 
Five years after, civil war in both countries is still raging resulted in the death of hundreds of 
thousands of people and millions of refugees.  
 
By identifying these causal mechanisms-state capacity, ethnic grievances, and third party 
intervention—this paper provides a broad understanding into the root causes of civil conflict, and 
has important policy implications. First, implementing policies to redress grievances could be an 
important tool for resolving an ongoing conflict. It is quite clear that an ongoing conflict will 
produce sever grievances, an environment only insurgent groups can benefit from. This will pose 
obstacles to settlements through negotiations. Grievances can be reduced by improving 
administrative quality, such as increasing the adherence to the rule of law, reducing corruption 
and creating a more effective and efficient bureaucracy. This is largely depends on a strong 
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economy. Economic growth should be supported because it tends to be associated with more 
competent governments. To this end, the international community and international 
organizations should develop programs and direct their efforts into improving the governance in 
countries experience political instability. Finally, conducting an effective counter-insurgency is 
an important element in reducing insurgent, as well as terrorist groups. The international 
community and major powers should condition their support to governments fighting insurgency 
on their employing of effective counter insurgency that do not, through their brutal killing of 
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